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Abstract: We analyze the incentive mechanism of individual micro-lending contracts and we
compare its key factors with those of joint-liability loan contracts. Using our data set, we firstly
show that in the individual contract there are three elements, the demand for non-conventional
collateral, a screening procedure which combines new with traditional elements, and dynamic
incentives in combination with the termination threat in case of default, which ensure high
repayment rates of up to 100%. We further show that the joint-liability approach may lead to
similar repayment rates, however based on a different incentive system. We reveal that the
target group which can be efficiently served by either one of the two mechanisms is different. 
                                                          
* We are very grateful for the comments and suggestions of Martin Bohl, Friedel Bolle, Marco
Caliendo, Tryphon Kollintzas, Jan Krahnen, and two anonymous referees, as well as of the
Seminar participants in Berlin, Dresden, Frankfurt (Oder), Hamburg and Speyer. We would also
like to thank Giorgi Nadareishvili for the support in the field as well as the team and the
borrowers of Constanta and MBG who agreed to participate in the questionnaire and who were
helpful in many ways, when we designed and conducted the empirical research. Vigenina thanks
for the financial support of Deutsche Bank Stiftung.1
1  INTRODUCTION
When talking about poverty alleviation, the slogan “to help the people help themselves out of
poverty” has become ubiquitous. One of the central means to realize this goal are the new
micro-finance approaches which all over the world lend small amounts of working-capital to
poor people who are without access to credit facilities. These small amounts should enable
them to increase their incomes above the poverty line by switching from day-labor, from
unemployment or from under-employment to self-employment. However, discussions about
the best way out of poverty often turn out to be ideologically driven. And so we can observe
within the micro-finance ‘movement’ two differing approaches which were developed over
the years and whose protagonists are charging each other´s model as inadequate.
Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs), in order to mitigate the typical problems created by the
informational asymmetries between the contracting parties, basically use two different
contract designs: the individual and the group micro-lending contract. Under the group
contract, loans are given to individuals but these individuals – instead of providing a collateral
– have to form groups of three to ten persons where all members are held mutually
responsible for all credits of the group until the last group member has fully repaid his loan.
Under the individual contract, lenders demand collateral for the loan but they also employ
new screening procedures combining elements from the traditional credit technology with
methods which are also used in the group-lending technology.
1
Methods used in both schemes are the so-called credit rationing
2, the termination threat,
regular repayment schedules and the dynamic incentives of eventually increasing loan sizes.
In addition, MFIs (more under the individual than under the group scheme) rely on detailed
analysis of the borrower’s business and household. Both kinds of contracts are able to induce
high repayment rates among borrowers (many MFIs report rates little less than 100%). And
both kinds of contracts are able to secure financially self-sustainable institutions, thus,
showing that the respective MFI is working successfully. Nevertheless, proponents of both
methods charge the work of the other side often as “not helpful” and suggest that one method
should be substituted by the other. The main argument raised against the individual contract is
that the collateral requirement makes it impossible to reach the target group of poor people
since it is in particular them who have nothing to pledge as collateral (see Khandker [1998]).
Against the group-loan contract it is raised that the screening, monitoring and enforcement
cost, for which originally the lender is responsible and which are partly transferred from the
lender to the group of borrowers (by having group meetings, monitoring of the group
members etc.), are too high for the borrowers (see e.g. Schmidt and Zeitinger [1997]). A
second complaint (see Madajewicz [1999]) is that group-loans decelerate the development of
                                                
1 There is a substantial theoretical literature on the group lending scheme. For an overview, cf. Morduch [1999].
2 cf. Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] for the fundamental analysis of the incentives created by credit rationing.2
businesses due to its restrictive increase of loan sizes. A third argument is that only with the
“relatively richer among the poor” (those who have collateral) it is possible to make ‘serious
business’ of a size which has an impact on the private sector.
The aim of the present paper is, therefore, by comparing a sample of individual with another
sample of group lending contracts, to better understand the advantages and the limits of both
mechanisms. To make such comparison meaningful we, firstly, analyze the individual loan
contract in its facets beyond the collateral requirement. We ask in particular which
components of the individual loan contract are responsible for the high repayment rates. Then,
we compare the incentive mechanisms of the individual with the group scheme (which is
more deeply analyzed in Vigenina and Kritikos [2003]) and we develop a test to determine
those factors which induce each borrower to choose either one of the two contracts.
The data used for testing the impact of all lending components and for the comparison of the
two lending schemes were obtained through questionnaires given to borrowers of two MFIs,
the Microfinance Bank of Georgia (MBG) which employs an individual lending scheme, and
the Foundation Constanta which uses a group lending scheme. Both micro-finance institutions
have branches in Batumi, Georgia, operating in a fully identical cultural and economic
environment and have partially overlapping target groups. Their different lending
technologies are the only factor responsible for the observed differences in (1) the outreach
and (2) the efficiency of the employed incentive mechanisms. This allows us to provide a
direct comparison between both programs and to answer the key research questions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the lending technology of
MBG. In section 3, a brief overview is given over the theoretical and empirical literature on
individual micro-lending mechanisms. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis of the
individual micro-lending technology. Section 5 compares its outcomes with the group-lending
method. Having determined the main factors responsible for the high repayment performance
we also address in section 5 the group versus individual lending debate. In section 6 some
conclusions are drawn with respect to the viability of both lending methods.
2  Lending at MBG, Georgia
The Lending Methodology: MBG Batumi (Microfinance Bank of Georgia) is an officially
licensed banking institution providing micro and small loans to individuals who are able to
pledge collateral.
3 Its target is to support micro and small entrepreneurs by granting them
loans which are specifically tailored to their needs. The loan size ranges from US$ 200 to US$
25.000 and has to be repaid within 1 month to five years (depending on the loan size and the
cash-flow of the borrower).
4 The nominal monthly interest rate varies with the credit size. For
                                                
3 It follows the credit technology of the German firm “Interdisziplinäre Project Consult” (IPC), which is
designed for micro and small enterprises, see also Churchill [1999].
4 Most commercial banks in Georgia focus on loans above $ 10.000.3
loans up to US$ 5.000 it ranges between 2,5% and 3% and is calculated on the basis of the
outstanding balance of the credit. MBG aims to establish a long-term relationship with its
borrowers and, thus, offers subsequent loans if previous ones were repaid on time.
5
Loans are usually repayable in monthly installments, and are backed by collateral, the value
of which should equal or exceed 150% of the amount due. MBG Batumi requires two kinds of
collateral – one covering the whole amount due (including interest rates) and the second one
covering two to three monthly installments.
6 As a second collateral the bank takes gold (due
to its high liquidity).
7 The main role of the second collateral is to discipline current borrowers
and decrease the losses for the bank when a default occurs. This requirement can be seen as a
self-selection mechanism separating diligent from non-diligent borrowers. The credible threat
of selling the gold in case of default discourages non-diligent borrowers from taking a loan.
The Lending Procedure and Enforcement Measures: The central role is given to the loan
officers. They bear the responsibility for the entire lending process – screening, monitoring,
and enforcement. In order to recognize the borrower’s risk type and to analyze his repayment
capacity, the loan officers make detailed cash-flow based analyses of the applicant’s
household and business. For reasons of risk diversification, MBG (as all micro-finance
organizations) does not separate the finances of the enterprise from those of the household
and analyzes all sources of revenues and expenses. In addition, the personal aspect is an
important part of the whole analysis on borrower’s creditworthiness. Most loan officers guess
that the ability to correctly analyze the clients’ personality with respect to his entrepreneurial
skills is crucial for their success. As the loan size increases, the importance of the personal
analysis diminishes at the expense of the financial analysis. Depending on their findings, the
loan officers determine repayment conditions that will fit possibly best the borrower’s
repayment capacity. The loan terms vary from client to client depending on the profitability of
the business project and on the client’s ability to show his creditworthiness.
The main monitoring tool of the loan officers is the regular repayment schedule. In addition,
they make unannounced informal visits at the borrowers´ sites. In case of delinquency the
enforcement measures depend on the reason of default. In case of temporary problems
repayment schedules are restructured. In case of permanent repayment problems the collateral
is seized and sold within few days if the borrower rejects repayment.
Branch Performance: MBG Batumi reached the operational break even point after five
months. At the time of our investigation the branch had over 1000 active borrowers, a total
net loan portfolio of around US$ 2 700 000, and a 100 % repayment rate. The approximate
number of clients per year served by one loan officer is around 100 persons. 
                                                
5 The core data of MBG correspond to the credit conditions offered by similar institutions in other countries, if
financial self-sufficiency is targeted. For an overview, see MicroCreditSummit [2002].
6 For loans up to US$ 2.500 the bank usually takes as collateral cars, TVs, VCRs, stoves, refrigerators, and other
household appliances. For larger amounts, above US$ 2.500, a mortgage on the house is required.
7 For the residents of this area keeping gold at home is a long national tradition.4
3  Existing Approaches and Research Agenda
3.1 Approaches on Individual Micro-Lending
While most research is concerned with the analysis of the group lending scheme, we will
concentrate on the individual incentive mechanism, i.e. on non-conventional collateral,
screening processes by the MFI, regular repayment schedules, and dynamic incentives.
When a loan contract should be concluded, the lending institution needs to find an effective
way to overcome the adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement problems. The main
mechanism addressing all three problems is given when the respective borrower is able to
signal his willingness for full loan repayment by pledging collateral which covers the loan
amount and the interest payment – as is required at MBG. In addition to the signaling process
by the borrower, at MBG (as in other individual micro-lending institutions, cf. e.g. Gonzales
Vega et al. [1997] or Churchill [1999]) the adverse selection problem is further directed by a
complementary screening process of the loan officer (see section 2) who aims to generate as
much information about the borrower’s repayment capacity as possible. In this process, as
Armendariz and Morduch [2000] note, “documentary evidence tends to be de-emphasized
relative to standard banking practices and local character assessment gains prominence.” Two
results are expected out of this combined signaling and screening process: Firstly, only
borrowers whose investment project promises a high probability of success are selected.
Secondly, borrowers may have access to higher loan volumes with less screening efforts by
their loan officer, if previous loans have been repaid on time (see also Madajewicz [1999]).
Section 2 has also highlighted the role of regular repayment schedules to prevent the borrower
from moral hazard behavior. There are two main reasons for employing this feature. First, if
the loan contract foresees regular installments, the loan officer receives early information if
the borrower faces a problem in his business. Second, regular repayments, in particular if the
repayment has started before the investment has created income to the borrower, enables the
MFI to lend against further income streams of the borrower’s household. 
When it comes to the enforcement of loan contracts, the loan officer is again enabled to
intimidate the borrower with several sanctions if the loan officer adjusted the size of the actual
loan to the current needs of the borrower and if he had given perspectives for a stream of
future loans of larger size. Besides the already mentioned threat of selling the collateral within
some days, loan officers can cut off defaulting borrowers from further access to loans, which
they may need to continue their business. (The effects of non-refinancing threats were first
formalized in Stiglitz and Weiss [1983].) Borrowers have an incentive to repay their current
loan as scheduled so that they will have access to further loans of increasing volume.
Going through the process of a typical loan contract at MBG, the present paper, firstly, aims
to find out to what extent each part of the incentive mechanism and the screening activities of5
the loan officers contribute to the high repayment rates at this particular MFI. Secondly, we
address the question to what extent potential competitors of MBG may reduce the provided
incentive to the borrowers of MBG to return the received capital. Third, having determined
the main reasons for the borrowers to repay their loans, we will compare them with the most
important factors leading to similarly high repayment rates in group-lending schemes.
3.2 Approaches on the Comparison of Micro-Lending Contracts
Induced by the discussions of different proponents of micro-lending we will employ in the
present paper a direct and a rather indirect comparison of the two contract designs with
respect to their incentives schemes. We aim to answer the questions to what extent
a)  borrowers perceive the group-lending scheme as a mechanism being too costly for them,
b)  the development of businesses is hampered by insufficient loan increases in the group
lending scheme,
c)  only group-lending schemes are adequate to reach the poor among the population.
Some of the questions were addressed from a theoretical point of view. If potential borrowers
lack collateral, Madajewicz [1999, p. 28.] shows that a group contract might be preferable to
an individual contract because “peer monitoring is more efficient than is monitoring by the
lender even when both have access to the same monitoring technology.” Vice versa, for the
richer among the poor borrowers (those who have collateral) the choice of the individual
contract is more efficient than the group contract because at the same cost they may get access
to larger loans. Thus, according to Madajewicz [1999] the choice of the contract (with either
lender or peer monitoring) is supposed to depend on wealth.
These theoretical assertions are supported by the empirical evidence from different group
lending programs in Bangladesh. In Madajewicz [1999] it is shown that group loans are larger
than individual loans at a low level of wealth while individual loans are larger than group
loans above a certain wealth level. It is concluded that the businesses of wealthier clients
which are financed by individual loans grew larger due to the access to higher loan volumes
than businesses financed by group loans. It seems, thus, that the main determinant for the
development of a business is the current wealth status of the borrower which determines the
access to either one of the two contract designs. As a consequence, one may expect that the
wealthier among the poor (those who are able to pledge collateral) may prefer individual to
group contracts.
8 In the present paper, therefore, we further aim to find out whether
d)  all wealthier among the poor borrowers prefer individual to group loans?
e)  the current wealth status of a borrower determines the future development of his business.
This culminates to the general question whether there is a better micro-lending design when
we compare the two kinds of contracts.
                                                
8 Such evidence is given e.g. in Otero and Rhyne [1994] and in Gonzales-Vega et al. [1997].6
4. Empirical Test of the Individual Micro-Finance Contract
In this section the sampling design and the data are presented. Along the line of the theoretical
propositions presented in section 3.1, our survey instrument focused on the borrowers’ socio-
economic characteristics and their interactions with the MFI. The borrowers of the two MFIs
were surveyed in winter 2001/2002. The interviews were carried out in and around the
Georgian City of Batumi. Since we were interested in the micro-lending activities of both
Institutions, the survey sample consists only of micro-entrepreneurs who received loans less
than 2.500 USD. We interviewed 125 randomly selected borrowers from MBG (13% of all
borrowers who received a micro loan in this branch) and 108 randomly selected groups from
Constanta (24% of the total number of borrowing groups). 11 clients of Constanta and 4 of
MBG were excluded from the final sample as we found inconsistencies in their responses
9.
The questionnaires given to the clients of Constanta and MBG were designed in a similar
way. Questions addressing the same program features (e.g. progressive lending, regular
repayment schemes) were kept fully identical.
For the subsequent tests we use an econometric model which replicates the two stage nature
of the principal-agent interaction: the stage where the borrowers are screened before the
contract is signed, and the stage where the repayments are enforced.
4.1 Testing the efficiency of the screening procedure
4.1.1 Hypothesis
The individual micro-lending technology implies a direct credit analysis on the borrower’s
creditworthiness in addition to the collateral requirements he has to meet (see sect. 2). Before
signing the contract, previous models (e.g. Armendariz and Morduch [2000]) predict that the
more efforts loan officers put into the assessment of the borrower’s business and household to
identify the risk type of every potential client the better will be tackled the adverse selection
problem which every lender faces. In Hypothesis 1, we operationalize this assertion:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the loan officer’s screening efforts, the higher the probability to
recognize the risk type of a borrower.
The process is replicated in equation (1). We specify an ordered logit model to estimate the
parameter coefficients. 
                          =           +           +                   +       +      
                                                
9 We tested the trustfulness of the information given by the clients by comparing the answers to certain questions
with the information we obtained directly from the loan officers. 121 interviewees answered truthfully and were
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where j = 1, 2, …, J indicates the ordered categories in the dependent variable.  
The dependent variable, Y1, reflects the default probability of the surveyed borrowers which
we denote as risk type. The borrowers were classified into three groups according to the risk
profile of their business projects
10: The clients ordered into group 1 were assessed as “higher
risk”, the clients from group 2 as “intermediate risk”, and those from group 3 as “low risk”. In
contrast to all other questions in the survey instrument, this classification was done by the
loan officers of the MBG Batumi. Their evaluation is based on the initial screening process
and in particular on the permanent updating process which is done by the loan officers by
considering the borrowers’ repayment behavior, their most recent cash-flow analysis, their
entrepreneurial characteristics and any other information which changed the risk profile.
Equation (1) reveals to what extent the individual lending technology is able to recognize the
borrower’s risk type if the screening effort is increased. The first independent variable, SE,
reflects the loan officers’ screening efforts. It is measured by the number of meetings between
the borrowers and the loan officers that took place prior to the loan disbursement.
Besides the screening efforts, the right-hand side contains the variables written records (WR),
education (E), and the industry sector (IS) of the client’s investment activity, factors which
are observable. They allow to test whether the lender (using further available information) is
able to better identify certain borrower types. E is a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1
if the respondent has a university degree and 0 otherwise
11. The parameter coefficient should
be positive if the assumption holds that higher educated people become better entrepreneurs.
WR (a dichotomous variable) shows whether the entrepreneur has any accounting skills or
not. The last variable, IS (a value of 0 for trade & services, 1 for production), allows to test
whether the borrowers involved in manufacturing activities are more successful then traders. 
4.1.2 Empirical Results
Hypothesis 1 will not be rejected if the β-coefficient of the screening efforts variable proves
to be significantly different from zero. Table 1 offers descriptions of all variables used in the
model. The tests of parameter significance are listed in Table 2. The z-statistics are estimated
                                                
10 The loan officers were asked to evaluate on an ascending scale the business projects of their clients (from 1 –
“very problematic” to 5 – “very stable and promising”). None of the businesses but one was assessed as “very
problematic” or “somewhat problematic”. 
11 The level of education in Georgia is high. In our sample 40% of the borrowers are university graduates.8
using the White heteroscedastisity-consistent covariance matrix to calculate standard errors
 12. 
- insert Tables 1 and 2 about here -
The empirical analysis reveals that screening efforts is significant with a positive coefficient.
Result 1: (1) The screening technology employed by MBG proved to be effective as its more
intensive implementation significantly increases the probability that the selected borrowers
will be of a better investment risk.
Result 1 is central in two ways: On the one hand, it supports the assertion that a micro-lender
cannot become successful as long as he bases the decision to borrow capital to a micro-
entrepreneur on his willingness to pledge collateral (even if it theoretically covers the full loan
amount). Only an additional costly assessment of the risk characteristics enables the MFI to
keep the later monitoring and enforcement cost at a low level. Since the MFI prefers to select
borrowers who will punctually repay their installments instead of having to seize their
collateral after a break down of their firm, the screening cost seem to be a “good investment”.
All other variables proved to be insignificant. It seems that the better education and the higher
accounting skills do not give any advantages to the local micro-entrepreneurs.
4.2 Testing the efficiency of further incentive mechanisms
4.2.1 Hypothesis
After the loan disbursement, theory predicts that the MFI may rely on different incentives,
such as collateral requirements, regular repayments, and the threat of excluding defaulting
borrowers from the access to further and to increasing loans (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss [1983],
Bolton and Scharfstein [1990]). In addition, earlier research (see inter alia von Pischke
[1991]) made clear that the repayment probability is also increased when households have
different kinds of income. In particular if the business project does not develop as expected
(where dynamic incentives stopped to have any influence on the repayment ability) the
chances of due repayment are the higher, the better the borrower’s income is diversified.
Moreover, Armendariz and Morduch [2000] made clear that the dynamic incentives will be
weakened if competition between MFIs becomes increasing, at least if there is no credit rating
agency. In order to estimate to what extent each part of this mechanism ensures that MFIs are
able to sufficiently solve the moral hazard and enforcement problems, and to what extent
these incentives are weakened by potential competitors, we provide
                                                
12 C.f. White [1982].9
Hypothesis 2: The higher a borrower values his collateral and the opportunity to establish a
long-term relationship with the bank and the better the income of the borrower is diversified,
the better his repayment performance will be.
Hypothesis 2 is analyzed by testing for parameter significance of the variables collateral,
dynamic incentives, income diversification, competition (between banks), and borrower’s risk
type, the dependent variable of hypothesis 1, in relation to the repayment performance of each
borrower. To examine the data we apply a tobit model.
 =     +        +               +         +         +                 +                             
ε γ γ γ γ γ γ α + + + + + + + = CH C ID Y DI CL Y 6 5 4 1 3 2 1
*
2 ,( 2 )
0 2 = Y  if  , 0
*
2 ≤ Y     
*
2 2 Y Y =  if  , 0
*
2 > Y
Equation (2) is introduced to capture the second stage of the principal-agent interaction. The
borrower’s  repayment performance is used as a dependent variable. Each borrower is
expected to pay monthly installments according to his individual schedule. Payments are due
on a particular day of the month. At the time of our investigation, there were no cases of
default or late payments in MBG Batumi. The case is quite the reverse. A large share of the
payments were contributed in advance. The managers of the bank consider this behavior as a
good indicator of the clients’ repayment performance. Since loan officers pay penalty fees to
the bank for each late payment of a borrower served by them, they encourage their clients to
make early installments so that they are able to avoid the occurrence of repayment failures.
And because the borrowers know that early repayments would help them build a good credit
history with the bank, they are willing to do so whenever they can. For the purpose of our
study we measure the repayment performance as the number of monthly installments paid by
the borrower in advance divided by the total number of contributed installments. The
necessary information we obtained directly from the borrowers’ files kept in the bank.
With respect to the independent variables, next to the five variables with which we test in
Hypothesis 2, we added the factor borrower’s credit history, assuming that it will influence
the repayment performance, as well. Starting with the description of the first independent
variable, collateral, borrowers were asked to evaluate on an ascending scale from 1 to 5 how
much time and effort it would take them to restore the collateral if the bank seized it.
According to standard theory, we expect to find evidence of a positive correlation between the
variable and the borrowers’ repayment performance. Dynamic incentives indicates to what




























the difference between the borrower’s actual credit needs and the value of the loan received,
expressed as a percentage of the loan amount: 
LoanSize
LoanSize s CreditNeed −
. The higher the ratio,
the higher the needs for additional financial means and hence the stronger is the borrower’s
motivation to apply for a larger loan. Thus, in the line of Bolton and Scharfstein [1990], we
expect a positive correlation between dynamic incentives and the repayment performance.
The same holds for the variable borrower’s risk type (see hypothesis 1) where it should be
expected that the repayment performance is better the lower the risk type of the borrower.
Further variables that are assumed to influence the borrowers’ repayment performance are:
Competition which is a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if the client reported to know
other financial institutions in the region he/she could borrow money from. According to
Armendariz and Morduch [2000], we expect that the greater the likelihood of being financed
by a second lender, the weaker will be the incentive to repay the first one. Income
diversification (in the household) is a scale ranging form 1 to 5 indicating to what extent the
alternative income sources in the borrower’s household exceed the income from the
investment project. In line with von Pischke [1991] we expect that the higher the income
diversification, the higher are the chances that the borrower will repay. Borrower’s credit
history is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the client reported to have borrowed
money for business purposes prior to joining the lending program of MBG.
4.2.2 Empirical Results
In Table 3 we report the results from the applied tobit model. As in equation (1) we use the
White heteroscedastisity-consistent covariance matrix to calculate standard errors.  The
empirical results support hypothesis 2. The borrowers’ repayment behavior is significantly
influenced by the following variables: collateral, dynamic incentives, borrower’s risk type,
and income diversification.
- insert Table 3 about here -
The present analysis underlines the importance of the collateral requirement as central method
to differentiate between high and low risk borrowers and to mitigate moral hazard behavior
among the chosen borrowers. The present analysis also supports those micro-finance
approaches which suggest that the mere collateral requirement is not sufficient to realize high
repayment rates. As the significance of the variable dynamic incentives shows, it is of similar
importance to employ step-lending measures which restrict the offered loan amount to the
actual needs of the client and which open the perspective to the client for having further
access to higher loan volumes only if he repays the current loan as agreed in the contract.
The significance of the variable, borrower’s risk type, underlines that, besides the self-
selection induced by the collateral requirement and the dynamic incentives, it is necessary for11
the financial success of the MFIs to run a screening procedure. The repayment performance
depends on the ability of the loan officers to correctly recognize the risk type of their clients
in order to avoid or reduce later enforcement cost such as seizing the collateral. Income
diversification is the last significant variable. Alternative income sources in the household can
be considered as a kind of insurance against delinquency in case of a business failure.
With respect to the variable competition, we expected to find evidence of a negative
correlation with the repayment performance. The coefficient is insignificant and close to zero,
showing that MBG does not have direct competitors in the region whose activities could
jeopardize its financial soundness. The insignificance of borrower’s credit history shows that
the earlier borrowing experience does not give any additional information to the bank about
the clients’ repayment behavior.
Result 2: To mitigate the moral hazard and enforcement problems MBG relies mainly on (1)
the efficiency of the loan officers’ work before the loan is disbursed and (2) the borrowers’
willingness to both preserve the collateral and establish long-term relationships with the bank
which offers them access to subsequently higher loans.
Result 2 stresses the necessity of having a complementary screening procedure in addition to
the self-selection processes created by the demand for collateral. Finally, it is remarkable that
before and after the loan disbursement positive incentives (assessment as a “good risk”,
access to higher loans) as well as negative sanctions (strong restrictions on the initial loan
size, pledging collateral which can be seized) are part of the incentive system.
5. Individual and Group Lending
5.1 Comparison of Key Factors of Individual and Joint-liability Loan Contracts
The aim of this study is also to compare the dynamics of individual loan contracts with joint-
liability. For revealing the crucial factors driving the repayment in both approaches, we need,
first of all, to give an overview of the main variables which lead to these repayment rates at
the MFI Constanta, the micro-lender who offers joint-liability contracts and who is situated in
the same area as MBG (and shares even offices). Similar to the above analysis, we separate
the key factors of joint liability with respect to the timing of their impact.
Self-selection is the main variable which determines whether or not a person will get access to
a group loan. It describes a process which implicitly contains two steps. The first step is the
process of assortative matching. Induced by joint liability, low-risk borrowers group with
other low-risk borrowers (by using local information which the MFI is unable to obtain) and
high-risk borrowers team up with high risk borrowers. The second step of the self-selection
process ensures that the joint-liability contract attracts only low-risk borrowers because it
pays only for them to accept the obligations of a group loan (being responsible for the full12
loan repayment of all group members). Thus, if the group loan-contract is designed in a
sufficient way it is possible to attract only borrowers with low risk characteristics.
After the loan disbursement, one has to distinguish between two states with respect to the
repayment performance. In state one, when the business development enables every group
member to pay his installment, group members usually make their loan repayments in order to
preserve their access to further loans. In state two, when the business development of one (or
more) member(s) in the group causes arrears, the incentive system and/or the complementary
pressure of the loan officers activates mutual processes within the borrowing group. With
respect to the borrowers of Constanta we could observe that, depending on the reasons of the
arrears, group members either gave financial peer support to delinquent partners, or increased
the controlling of their activities, or put the delinquent borrowers under peer pressure to make
their installments. These mutual activities forced delinquent borrowers to repay their debt
(with delay), but at the end they were able to realize repayment rates of nearly 100%. It is also
necessary to emphasize that these high repayment rates could only be realized because of the
complementary screening and enforcement process carried out by the loan officers.
13
Comparing now the key factors it becomes clear: At Constanta the self-selection process is
secured by assortative matching, while at MBG it is induced by collateral which the
borrowers are ready to pledge, in MBG supported by higher screening efforts of the loan
officers than in Constanta. Accordingly, at Constanta one loan officer serves up to 450 clients,
while at MBG their number does not exceed 100 Clients. Obviously, loan officers at
Constanta have only complementary duties in the self-selection process while the loan
officers at MBG play a major role with respect to the risk assessment of the borrowers.
Under the individual loan-contract it is the pressure of the loan officers to sell the collateral in
case of default which instigates borrowers to pay back their loans. And it is the prospect of
access to higher loans which induces the borrowers to repay on time or even earlier. Under
joint-liability contracts the members of the group take over part of the controlling and of the
pressure towards delinquent borrower(s) in particular if the latter himself is responsible for the
arrears. The loan officers again have “only” complementary duties aiming to secure the
necessary mutual processes at an early stage of the delinquency. It is further remarkable that
access to subsequent but not to higher loans is part of the reason to pay on time. At Constanta,
only a minority of borrowers increased their loan size to the extent allowed by the MFI.
The comparison of the key factors clarifies certain aspects that were controversially discussed
in theory and practice: On the one hand, the collateral is confirmed to be crucial in the
individual lending contract. It cannot be discarded without substitute, as suggested in
Armendariz and Morduch [2000, 401] who argue that programme features as “direct
monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats” ... will
                                                
13 For more details, cf. Kritikos and Vigenina [2003].13
“generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and
without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability”. On the other hand, the
collateral may be fully substituted by a joint-liability approach. Joint-liability serves as a self-
selection criterion and as an enforcement device of similar power as a collateral and is able to
ensure high repayment rates, as well.
14
Moreover, loan volumes offered by the two MFIs are different. At Constanta, the average loan
size is 220 Euro, at MBG it is 965 Euro. In order to be profitable (at similar interest rates
which Constanta is charging in comparison to MBG), under joint-liability the efforts of the
loan officers need to be reduced. Since the necessary amount of efforts is more or less the
same irrespective of the loan size, the major part of these efforts needs to be transferred to
somebody else, unless interest rates are increased to the amount local usurers are charging.
15
And so it happened at Constanta where the group of borrowers handle most of these tasks
while the loan officers are restricted to some complementary duties so that the transaction cost
for the bank staff could be reduced at the expense of their clients.
The differing incentive systems allow for a first conclusion: The two MFIs target different
types of borrowers. This induces selection processes not only with respect to the question
whether a potential borrower is able to show his creditworthiness but also with respect to the
MFI the borrower will choose. It would have been impossible with the incentive system of
MBG to select those clients without collateral which successfully applied for a loan contract
at Constanta and it would have been impossible for Constanta to serve the borrowers of MBG
with the adequate loan product fitting to the incentive structure of the group-loan contract.
5.2 Factors Determining the Choice of the Lending Contract
5.2.1 Hypothesis
While in the last section we employed a rather indirect comparison between the two designs,
in this subsection, we focus on the direct comparison of group with individual lending
contracts. In particular we want to find out, which product is preferred by the borrowers and
which reasons may account for the revealed preferences.
Earlier research highlighted the benefits of individual loans and the disadvantages of group
loans. Madajewicz [1999] emphasized that group-loans are usually highly standardized and
offer the same loan terms and conditions to all clients without taking into account their
individual needs. Gonzales-Vega et al. [1997] and Diagne [1997] pointed out that under the
                                                
14 See e.g. Gonzales-Vega et al. [1997], Paxton [1996] and Sadoulet [1997] where doubts were raised that joint-
liability could serve as a full substitute for collateral.
15 See e.g. Diagne [1997] who describes the excessive costs of joint liability. Our comparison makes clear that
those borrowers who lack collateral and need small amounts have the choice between joint-liability contracts and
the offer of the local usurer. It is then obvious that low-risk borrowers for whom joint liability is not leading to
excessive costs will prefer group contracts and high risk borrowers will prefer the offer of the usurer.14
group-loans borrowers may suffer from increased transaction cost because of their obligations
to participate in meetings, to be present for jointly signing contracts, to monitor their peers,
and to impose social sanctions. In contrast to this, the same three approaches stress that the
individual lending contracts are usually personalized which means that the loan terms and
conditions match the client’s demand and the cash flows of his enterprise. Besides, borrowers
do not bear the risk of losses from extra payments when other group members do not repay.
If we confront now these arguments with each other, we could derive the simple hypothesis
that borrowers are supposed to prefer individual to group-lending contracts. Micro-
entrepreneurs may become borrowers at a group-lending program only if they do not have
access to individual loans either because they do not possess any collateral to pledge or
because there is no MFI in their neighborhood offering individual contracts.
Empirical results do not fully support these assertions. If it holds we should expect that all
borrowers of Constanta lack sufficient assets to pledge as collateral. However, we found that
11% of them were able to secure their loans at the time they signed the joint-liability contract.
Apparently, there must be other reasons inducing some micro-entrepreneurs to deliberately
choose a group-lending contract.
At the end of section 5.1 we suggested that there might be a self-selection process where
clients choose a MFI for reasons other than their wealth status. In particular, we showed that
dynamic incentives had no significant influence on the repayment behavior of the borrowers
of Constanta, but did matter at MBG. In this case, it would not be the loan product which
determines the size of the investment. It may be ‘the other way around’, namely that there are
borrowers demanding different loan amounts. In recent research (Lazear [2003] and Kritikos
and Wießner [2004]), it is suggested that entrepreneurs might be classified into different types
characterized by their skills in the decision process of developing a business project.
Depending on these skills, there might be entrepreneurs who are able to plan a business of
increasing size (to be classified as dynamic business throughout the rest of the paper). Due to
the dynamic perspective of their investment, these entrepreneurs might become borrowers
who need increasing loan volumes. And there might be entrepreneurs who are planing – due
to their lower skills - a business with lower dynamic perspective (to be classified as static
business). Due to the lower dynamic perspective of their investments, these types may
become borrowers who do not need substantial increases in the loan volume. This leads to
Hypothesis 3: If an individual and a group lending organization operate in the same market
niche, there will be a self-selection process not only with respect to the wealth status but also
with respect to the financial needs which are determined by the expected dynamics of the
borrower’s business.
Hypothesis 3 will not be rejected if we find significant differences in the business
development between the clients of MBG and of those clients of Constanta who are able to15
pledge collateral. For the test we apply equation 3 inserting the variables business
development, interest rate and education. To obtain the coefficient estimates we employ a
binary logit model.




















where Y3 = 1 if the borrower has an individual lending contract, 0 otherwise. The data we use
for the test include only those borrowers who had sufficient assets to pledge collateral.
The dependent variable in equation 3 is determined by the choice of the contract. Business
development (BD) is the first factor which is expected to influence the choice of the lending
contract. It reflects (on an ascending scale from 1 to 5) the development of the borrower’s
business project since the borrower received his first loan. We expect the borrowers with
faster developing businesses to favor personalized, individual contracts.
The second independent variable, interest rate (IR), measures the sensitivity of credit demand
to interest rate. It is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the entrepreneur said he would
have taken a loan at interest rate of 5 – 8% per month.
16 Expectations are that group-loan
borrowers will be less sensitive to the cost of borrowing than individual loan borrowers,
because the former ones basically need access to loans of a size where the credit cost in
relation to the generated income are rather small. Marginal returns on the uses of these funds
are higher than the cost of borrowing. The higher, however, the size of the loan amount (as in
the individual loan contract) the more matters its cost in relation to the generated income. We,
thus, expect that borrowers of very small loans (those who use group-loans) are not sensitive
to changes in interest rates and that borrowers (who use individual loans) become more and
more sensitive to changes in the interest rate as the loan amount is increased. Education
stands for higher knowledge. For its description see hypothesis 1.
We also aim to find out to what extent borrowers themselves were satisfied with the products
offered by the two MFIs. For that we analyze to what extent the borrowers’ needs were met
by the products offered by the two MFIs and we will compare the respective results. We
asked all surveyed borrowers to self-evaluate on a scale from 1 to 5 (1) how well the
repayment schedule fitted with their cash flows, and (2) how well the received loan covered
their business needs. The two scales are used to measure the degree of borrower’s satisfaction.
The null hypothesis states that there is no significant difference in the distributions of both
populations. According to earlier empirical evidence of Gonzales-Vega [1997] we state as
                                                
16 At the time of our investigation Constanta charged an interest rate of 4%, MBG 3%, local usurers of 10%. 
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Hypothesis 4: Borrowers who signed an individual lending contract are more satisfied with
the loan terms and conditions than borrowers who signed a group contract.
The hypothesis is tested by applying a two independent-samples t-test for equality of means.
5.2.2 Empirical Results
Hypothesis 3 is tested by employing equation 3. The descriptive statistics on the key variables
and the parameter estimates are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The empirical results speak in
favor of our inference that the two MFIs attract different types of borrowers. The first
significant variable business development supports the earlier suggestion that there is a self-
selection process in the choice of the lending contract which depends on the expected
dynamics of the business project.
- insert Tables 4 and 5 about here -
IR is the second significant variable. Its negative coefficient shows that the demand for group
loans is less sensitive to interest rate than the demand for individual loans. This finding
supports the assumption that borrowers who sign joint-liability contracts care more about
access to capital than about price. Education is statistically insignificant.
Result 4: (1) Besides the wealth status, the other main factor determining the choice of the
lending contract is the dynamics of the business project. Borrowers with dynamic business
projects prefer individual loans, borrowers with static business projects rather prefer group
loans. (2) Businesses with a dynamic perspective who have higher financial needs are more
sensitive to the cost of borrowing than static businesses.
This outcome, if true, faces one severe limitation. The original reason for installing joint-
liability approaches is the aim to provide those borrowers with working capital who lack
collateral. Since there is no perfect correlation between the two selection criteria, one has to
find solutions for those borrowers who lack collateral but plan a dynamic business and those
borrowers who have collateral and a static business ahead. 
With respect to the latter ones the solution is straightforward. As we showed, Constanta is
also open to borrowers who possess collateral. This poses no problem as long as there are not
too many borrowers with collateral in one and the same group (cf. Kritikos [1999], Woolcock
[1999]).
17 The existence of say one member with assets in a group of borrowers without
collateral may have even a stabilizing function for the group.
The solution for borrowers of dynamic businesses without collateral is different. In the
beginning their only way to signal creditworthiness is via a joint-liability contract. As soon as
                                                
17 In the latter case, major mechanics of the incentive system do not work. In particular the termination threat
looses its power if the group consists only of borrowers with collateral.17
their business shows positive dynamics and as soon as they have collected enough assets, they
may switch to the individual approach, having gone through several loan periods in the group
approach. In fact, loan officers at MBG offensively target borrowers of Constanta if they
gathered some form of collateral. Being in a status of no wealth and no collateral does not
mean that this state is irreversibly given. Rather to the contrary, by a combination of group
loans in the beginning and individual loans after a graduation period, it becomes possible that
very poor borrowers may become dynamic entrepreneurs. No business is hampered then and
the initial wealth status looses its impact on the future development of the borrower.
Turning to hypothesis 4 we first perform the test by using the full dataset of MBG and
Constanta borrowers. According to the t-test for equality of means
18 the mean values of both
scales are significantly higher in the sample consisting the borrowers of MBG. The difference
comes mainly from the fact that at Constanta both the loan size and the repayment schedule
were reported to fit the needs of the borrowers “well” or “very well” while at MBG they fit
“very well” or “extremely well”.
Comparing the level of satisfaction of the clients of MBG with those of Constanta who were
able to pledge collateral shows that the difference is insignificant. The fact that Constanta
offers smaller loans with shorter maturity terms does not induce that its loan characteristics fit
worse the business needs of this particular group of borrowers. This finding supports our
earlier assertion that the group-lending scheme also attracts relatively wealthier entrepreneurs. 
Result 5: The individual lending contract is better designed to meet the needs of the micro-
entrepreneurs. The difference between the two designs diminishes, when we compare the
borrowers of MBG with those borrowers of Constanta who are able to pledge collateral.
6. Conclusions
The focus of the present paper is twofold. On the one hand, we analyze the key factors of
individual micro-lending contracts. On the other hand we compare these with the key factors
of joint-liability contracts and address the discussion which of the two is the better mechanism
to provide entrepreneurs and self-employed persons with micro-loans in an efficient manner.
Starting with the key factors of individual micro-loan contracts we showed that the variable
collateral is the crucial variable in the self-selection process. However, if it is aimed to realize
high repayment rates, the MFI has also to undertake intensive screening activities of the
borrowers’ business and household incomes. When the contract is signed, reliable borrowers
get access to further and higher loans. Less reliable persons are threatened with termination of
                                                
18 The null hypothesis states that the difference between the two sample means for each of the tested variables is
zero. 
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the contract and with the selling of the collateral in case of delinquency. MBG is able to
realize a 100% repayment rate by making use of this combination of incentives and threats.
In comparison to the individual micro-lending contract, we showed that joint-liability is able
to work as a perfect collateral substitute since it selects creditworthy borrowers among those
who lack collateral. We also showed that a second difference between the two approaches is
that the incentives inducing high repayment rates may be completely different. Individually-
based contracts may rely on dynamic incentives and on collateral. Joint-liability approaches
rely on the (group) access to further (but not to higher) loans and on peer processes.
This leads directly to the further questions, formulated in section 3.2. Repeatedly, it was
argued that the cost of joint liability are excessive. Taking ‘voting by feet’ as the best measure
of acceptable cost, the present paper made clear that within the existing market alternatives
those borrowers who chose joint-liability, perceive its cost as lower as the lending cost of the
local usurer. Individual micro-loans, often used as benchmark for “acceptable cost”, are not
relevant as long as the prerequisite for being able to borrow from them is not met.
It appears to be more remarkable that there are also wealthier borrowers who deliberately
choose joint-liability contracts although they are able to pledge collateral and although the
interest rate of the individual lender is lower. This observation contradicts earlier assertions
that peer measures resulting out of joint-liability are only to be interpreted as a matter of a
cost transfer from the lender to the borrower. Most borrowers who deliberately stay with
Constanta made clear that they are willing to provide peer support within the group. These
borrowers may also derive positive utility out of group contracts: Peer support works like an
insurance against repayment problems of a borrower. If he had to manage his problems
independently, as in the individual approach, he might have failed with higher probability.
This puts also into question whether the current wealth status of a borrower determines the
future development of his business. We believe that we have discovered a parallel self-
selection process with respect to the choice of the micro-lending contract, at least in this
region. Business approaches with a rather static development perspective and, accordingly, a
demand for relatively low loan volumes prefer the joint-liability approach of Constanta.
Business approaches with a dynamic development perspective and a demand for relatively
high or increasing loan volumes are attracted by the offers of MBG.
This kind of self-selection is important to note insofar as it implicitly contains an efficiency
component. Earlier research (see e.g. Paxton [1996]) proved that joint-liability approaches
face in the long run mismatching problems when groups are formed whose businesses
develop in a dynamic way. In groups where some businesses were generating very high
profits and others not, the willingness for being jointly responsible for the repayment of the
loans dramatically decreased. In Kritikos and Vigenina [2003] we found out that in groups
where the businesses show a rather static development “with no ups and downs”, the19
willingness for peer support even increased so that these groups provided a stable
environment with no mismatching problems in the long run. Thus, parallel offers of
individual and joint-liability approaches by one and the same or by two different MFIs would
lead to an efficient allocation of credit risks and lending costs, if the products are designed in
a way that the corresponding self-selection process is induced.
Then no businesses are decelerated and no borrower will complain about the additional
screening, monitoring and enforcement cost. Under this condition, the future development of
a client’ business is only determined by the skills and abilities of the entrepreneur. Non-
wealthy clients with plans for a dynamic business but without collateral, however, will have
to make the “detour” via the joint-liability approach. Otherwise, they will not be able to signal
their creditworthiness, when they apply for a loan contract for the very first time.
Therefore, with respect to the question whether there is a superior design of micro-lending
contracts, we conclude as follows: There is a large spectrum of loans for micro-businesses
which are not served by the commercial banking system. In Georgia for example, where our
research was carried out, the commercial banking system starts to offer loans above 10.000
Euro. Loans of smaller amounts are available only from so called Micro Finance Institutions
where smaller loans between 50 Euro and 500 Euro are offered by the joint-liability approach
of Constanta and loans between 200 Euro and 10.000 Euro are offered by MBG using
individual contracts. Therefore, a combination of both approaches is necessary if it is aimed to
reach all creditworthy borrowers irrespective of their initial wealth status and their ability to
provide collateral and irrespective of the expected dynamics of the client’s business. If only
individual loan contracts are offered, creditworthy borrowers without collateral are excluded.
If only joint-liability loan contracts are offered, dynamic businesses will be hampered and
borrowers are not able to leave the poverty status behind them or – if the joint-liability loan
contracts should be increased to meet the demands of the more dynamic businesses – the
groups will run into mismatching problems where the willingness of being jointly responsible
for the repayment of the group loans is diminished over time.
To put it in a nutshell: If poverty alleviation is aimed to be fully realized where all kind of
entrepreneurs have a lasting access to credit, a combination of individual and group loans
should be offered. There is no better design. Individual and joint-liability contracts dovetail
the micro-finance movement.20
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Borrower’s Risk Type (Categorical Variable): 3 - Low risk borrowers; 
2 – Intermediate risk borrowers; 1 - Higher risky borrowers.
3 – 21 (22.1%)
2 – 49 (51.6%)
1 – 25 (26.3%)
  
Repayment Performance: Number of installments paid by the borrower in
advance over the total number of contributed installments.
Independent Variables:
Screening Efforts: Number of meetings between the borrower and the loan
officer prior to the loan disbursement. 
2.391
(1.667)
Credit Needs: Actual credit needs (in USD) 2946.05
(1952.09)
Education (Dichotomous Variable): 0 – secondary school or college;
1 – university.
0 – 61 (60.4%)
1 – 40 (39.6%)
Written Records: Dichotomous Variable with a value of 1 if the borrower
was able to present his/her own income-expense written records before
receiving the first loan, 0 otherwise.
0 – 31 (30.7%)
1 – 70 (69.3%)
Industry Sector (Dichotomous Variable): 0 – trade & services; 1– production. 0 – 66 (65.3%)
1 – 35 (34.7%)
Collateral: Score (from 1 to 5) indicating how much time and efforts it would
take the borrower to restore the collateral in case the bank seized it.
3.45
(1.13)
Dynamic Incentives: The difference between the actual credit needs of the




Competition: Dichotomous Variable taking a value of 1 if the client reported




Income Diversification: Score (from 1 to 5) indicating how much the
alternative income sources exceed the income from the business project. 
1.61
(.86)
Borrower’s Credit History: Dichotomous Variable with a value of 1 if the
client reported to have borrowed money for business purposes before joining
the lending program of MBG, 0 otherwise.
0 – 74 (72.5%)
1 – 28 (27.5%)
TABLE 2. MBG: ORDERED LOGIT MODEL OF BORROWERS’ PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
          Number of obs   =         99
                                                  Wald chi2(4)    =       4.92
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2952
Log pseudo-likelihood = -100.10234                Pseudo R2       =     0.0241
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Borrower’s   |               Robust
Risk Type    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Screening 
Efforts      |    .256786   .1275675     2.01   0.044     .0067583    .5068137
Education    |   .2970942   .4898641     0.61   0.544    -.6630218     1.25721
Industry
Sector       |   .0397173   .3179168     0.12   0.901    -.5833881    .6628228
Written 
Records      |  -.1023359   .4516666    -0.23   0.821    -.9875861    .7829143
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept 1  |   .1518408   1.187274          (Ancillary parameters)
Intercept 2  |   2.466685   1.213019 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The table presents the results from the ordered logit model used to test hypothesis 1 (equation (1)). The
regression coefficients are listed in column 2. The robust standard errors calculated by using the White
heteroscedastisity-consistent covariance matrix are shown in column 3. The z-statistics and the p-values are
presented respectively in column 4 and 5. 23
TABLE 3. MBG: TOBIT MODEL OF BORROWERS’ REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE
                                         Number of obs   =         92
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      23.64
Log pseudo-likelihood = -57.397712                Prob > chi2     =     0.0006
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repayment      |               Robust
Performance    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Collateral     |   .1135741   .0387953     2.93   0.003     .0375366    .1896116
Dynamic 
Incentives     |   .1008585   .0349025     2.89   0.004     .0324509    .1692662
Borrower’s 
Risk Type      |   .1578087   .0647202     2.44   0.015     .0309595    .2846579
Income 
Diversification|   .0994986    .051626     1.93   0.054    -.0016865    .2006837
Borrower’s Credit
History        |   .0430619   .0962837     0.45   0.655    -.1456506    .2317744
Competition    |    .006889   .0310511     0.22   0.824    -.0539702    .0677481
Intercept      |  -.6278609   .2553391    -2.46   0.014    -1.128316   -.1274054
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Observation summary:        68     uncensored observations
                              24  left-censored observations
The table presents the results from the tobit model of borrowers’ repayment performance used to test hypothesis
2 (equation (2)). The regression coefficients are listed in column 2. The robust standard errors calculated by
using the White heteroscedastisity-consistent covariance matrix are shown in column 3. The z-statistics and the
p-values are presented respectively in column 4 and 5.




Individual or. Group Lending Contract: Dichotomous Variable = 1 if the borrower
is a client of MBG Batumi;
= 0 if the borrower is a client of Constanta
0 –   11(  0%)
1 - 115 (90%)
Independent Variables:
Business Development: Score (from 1 to 5) indicating how well the borrower’s
business project has developed since the disbursement of the first loan.
3.97
(.495)
Education (Dichotomous Variable): 0 – secondary school or college; 1 – university 0 – 77 (64%)
1 – 44 (36%)
Interest Rate: Dichotomous Variable with a value of 1 if the borrower would have
taken a loan at an interest rate of 5 – 8%, 0 otherwise.
0 – 127 (96%)
1 –    5 (   4%)
TABLE 5. INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP LENDING: BINARY LOGIT MODEL
    Number of obs   =        126
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =      15.75
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0013
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -36.35528                Pseudo R2       =     0.1729
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individual or|               Robust
Group Lending|      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Interest rate|   -2.35874   .9112711    -2.59   0.010    -4.144798   -.5726811
Education    |    .251415   .6822037     0.37   0.712     -1.08568     1.58851
Business
Development  |   1.590841   .6310934     2.52   0.012      .353921    2.827762
Intercept    |  -4.391869   3.095708    -1.42   0.156    -10.45935    1.675608
The table presents the results from the binary logit model defined in equation (3). The regression coefficients are
listed in column 2. The robust standard errors calculated by using the White heteroscedastisity-consistent
covariance matrix are shown in column 3. The z-statistics and the p-values are presented respectively in column
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